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The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, 
Then and Now 
Thomas C. Berg ∗ 
I. THE FOUNDING ERA CHURCH-STATE SETTLEMENT  
AND THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE 
Professor Carl Esbeck’s paper,1 which offers a historical 
perspective on the issue of church autonomy, will serve as a terrific 
resource for future work by legal scholars. Professor Esbeck 
introduces into the legal literature a discussion of how church-state 
relations developed in the forty years after the ratification of the First 
Amendment. He surveys the writing on that period by leading 
observers and scholars of American religion, such as Robert Baird, 
Sidney Mead, Philip Schaff, William Warren Sweet, and Alexis de 
Tocqueville.2 One can argue that, with respect to religious freedom, 
our nation’s “founding era” really extends to encompass these later 
decades, concluding with the demise of the last state regime of tax 
assessments for religious teaching, that of Massachusetts, in 1833.3 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), and Co-
Director, Terence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy. Thanks 
to Fred Gedicks and Deborah Wright for their hospitality at the Conference on Church 
Autonomy at Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, February 6–7, 2004, at 
which I gave the remarks on which this paper is based. Thanks to the participants in the 
conference, especially Kathleen Brady, for illuminating comments and discussion of various 
points. 
 1. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the 
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385. 
 2. Id. at 1547–70; see also, e.g., ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (Edwin S. Gaustad ed., Arno Press & The New York Times 1969) (1844); SIDNEY 
E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1976); 
PHILIP SCHAFF, AMERICA: A SKETCH OF ITS POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS 
CHARACTER (Perry Miller ed., 1961) (1855); WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, REVIVALISM IN 
AMERICA: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND DECLINE (1944); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1851). 
 3. For other historical works connecting these periods, see, for example, EDWIN 
GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: RELIGION AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1776–1826 
(1987); WILLIAM MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630–1833 (1971). 
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Professor Esbeck primarily describes the church-state 
“settlement” of the founding era and the early republic. The nature 
of that settlement combined basic religious freedom for all faiths 
(free exercise) with government noninvolvement in the distinctive 
sphere of religious life and in the churches (nonestablishment). The 
specific features of the settlement included: 
(1) A separation of church and state that emphasized the 
exclusion of the state from “inherently religious” activities and that 
was designed primarily to protect the vitality and independence of 
religious groups.4 This separation stood in marked contrast to a 
separationism founded on a suspicion of religion and a desire to 
protect society from religious oppression—a prime example of which 
is the laicité principle arising out of the French Revolution.5 
(2) Equal governmental treatment of all faiths—in part to avoid 
divisions that had arisen when colonial or state governments favored 
one faith.6 
(3) A reaffirmation that religious principles and voices were 
crucial to the health of society and therefore were welcome in 
politics and public debate. Those religious principles, however, were 
to be nurtured in voluntary associations independent of the state.7 
This founding-era settlement, Professor Esbeck notes, is well 
summarized in the “voluntary principle” described in the 1840s by 
Presbyterian historian Robert Baird. As Baird painted the picture, 
government would neither suppress nor promote worship: 
In every state liberty of conscience and liberty of worship is 
complete. The government extends protection to all. . . . The 
proper civil authorities have nothing to do with the creed of those 
who open a place of worship. 
. . . . 
 On the other hand, . . . neither the general government nor that 
of the States does any thing directly for the maintenance of public 
worship.  
 4. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1393–94, 1590–91. 
 5. For a thorough discussion of French laicité and American religious freedom, critical 
of some of the applications of both, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicité: A 
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419. 
 6. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1394, 1396, 1569. 
 7. Id. at 1398–1400. 
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  . . . [Religion relies] upon the efforts of its friends, acting from 
their own free will.8 
Professor Esbeck’s focus on this widespread historical consensus 
is salutary for our current debates about church autonomy and other 
church-state issues. Taking a historical consensus as a starting point 
helps us—and. more importantly, judges interpreting the 
Constitution—to choose among the wide array of possible 
approaches to church-state relations. When judges are disciplined by 
history, they cannot simply enunciate whatever approach to church 
and state they like and baptize it with the broad language of the First 
Amendment. Moreover, history affects our present situation. 
America may be a nation of frontiersmen and immigrants, but even 
here individuals and societies do not entirely reinvent themselves. If 
the voluntarist approach was the dominant principle of church-state 
relations adopted in our founding era, it deserves at least serious 
consideration as an approach today as well. 
However, the lessons of history can also be complicated, and that 
is the issue I wish to explore in this commentary. Professor Esbeck 
aims to identify the widespread consensus about religion and 
government in early America. Consistent with this emphasis on 
consensus, he discusses two issues of current law whose proper 
resolution is unambiguous under the voluntary principle. First, 
Professor Esbeck argues that religious perspectives should be 
welcome in political debate and activity on the same terms as other 
perspectives.9 Second, and related, he writes that religious speech 
and activity should be welcome in public schools on the same terms 
as their secular counterparts, as the Court has repeatedly held.10 
But in setting forth this consensus, Professor Esbeck does not 
focus on issues that, as to the voluntary principle of antebellum 
America, were ambiguous or contained internal tensions. Where 
such ambiguities exist, the application of the founding-era settlement 
to these issues in modern times could be expected to produce hard 
 8. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 287−88; see also Esbeck, supra note 1, at 259−62 
(summarizing Baird’s description). 
 9. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1397 n. 30. 
 10. Id. at 1585–86; see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 
(2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol 
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
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cases. And indeed it has. The three areas on which the precise 
contours of the voluntary principle were open to question were, as I 
will try to show: (1) government financial aid to the human services 
provided by religious organizations, such as education and social 
work; (2) government promotion of general religious ideas through 
nonfinancial, noncoercive means, such as prayers in public schools; 
and (3) constitutional protection of the private religious conduct of 
churches or individual believers against restrictions by general laws 
not aimed at religion.11 Not surprisingly, these are the areas of 
church-state interaction that remain hotly disputed and regularly 
litigated. 
In these comments, I look first at the history, proceeding from 
Professor Esbeck’s solid foundation, to explore how the voluntary 
principle contained ambiguities with respect to each of these three 
areas. Next I look at translating that history into the present: I 
explore how circumstances have changed since the early republic and 
how those changes might affect the application of the voluntary 
principle to today’s hard cases. I conclude that the changes have 
strengthened the case for forbidding government’s own expression 
of its preferred religious view, but that they have also strengthened 
the case for exempting some private religious conduct from generally 
applicable laws and for permitting religious organizations to receive 
some kinds of government financial aid. In keeping with the theme 
of the conference, I concentrate on how the founding-era settlement 
might apply particularly to the autonomy of churches and other 
religious organizations. 
 11. As Professor Esbeck puts it, “practice [in the 1800s] lagged behind principle” 
concerning the voluntarist settlement; “Americans did not always foresee the full ramifications 
when lofty principle was later worked out at the retail level.” Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1400. 
This was particularly true with respect to “the state’s verbal and symbolic endorsement” of 
Christianity in forms other than “funding support”—such as school prayers, legislative prayers, 
civic pledges, thanksgiving proclamations, and so forth. Id. at 1400 n.39. I discuss these 
practices infra in Part II.A. 
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II. THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE AND CHURCH  
AUTONOMY, THEN AND NOW 
A. Government Noncoercive Religious Statements and Ceremonies 
The first issue on which the founding-era settlement contained 
ambiguities or internal tensions is the government’s sponsorship of 
religious exercises, ceremonies, or teachings, such as legislative 
prayers, Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and prayers or Bible 
readings in public schools. Such official religious affirmations were 
pervasive in nineteenth-century America. Here and later, I quote 
Robert Baird, who, as Professor Esbeck notes, was virtually 
unequaled in his “comprehensive understanding of ‘the whole range 
of religious activity in the [antebellum] United States.’”12 
Notwithstanding the principle that religious activity should be 
voluntary and all faiths equal, Baird noted that legislation in the 
states “is still decidedly favourable, in general, to the interests of 
Christianity.”13 Although the states “relinquish[ed] all attempts to 
promote religion by what is called an establishment, yet they . . . 
deemed it neither unwise nor unjust to pursue the same end 
indirectly.”14 Baird cited as examples Sunday-closing laws, 
antiblasphemy laws, theistic oaths in court, and officially sponsored 
Bible readings in “most” of the (then very new) state-sponsored 
schools.15 
Such indirect practices seemed to be approved by the church-
state settlement: government noninvolvement in the province of the 
church did not mean total government separation from general 
religious ideas and affirmations relevant to civic life. As Professor 
Esbeck puts it, many Americans “rationalized” such nonfinancial 
support of religion “as not inconsistent with the American 
church/state settlement” in large part because it “was not coercive 
but only ceremonial; no one had to believe it,” though the 
government would teach it.16 Yet as Professor Esbeck also suggests, 
 12. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1552 (quoting ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN AMERICA: A 
CRITICAL ABRIDGEMENT xiii (Henry Warden Bowen ed., 1970) (1856)). 
 13. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 273. 
 14. Id. at 277. 
 15. Id. at 274, 279; see also id. at 279 (adding that “[w]here [primary-school teachers] 
are pious, they find no difficulty in giving a great deal of religious instruction”). 
 16. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1400–01 n.39. 
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such practices also seemed to contravene several aspects of the 
voluntary principle.17 They did constitute government involvement 
in religious matters; religion was not left wholly to private initiative. 
These practices could sap the vitality of religious ideas by corrupting 
them to serve government’s ends rather than divine mandates. And 
the practices did, in at least an indirect sense, treat as less equal those 
who did not share the generalized Christian faith reflected in them. 
In the late twentieth century, of course, the Supreme Court 
began to strike down such practices—beginning with state-
composed prayers in the public schools—as violations of the 
Establishment Clause, incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18 These decisions can be justified in part on the basis of 
the autonomy of churches and religious life: the autonomy that, as 
Professor Esbeck shows, was central to the American church-state 
settlement. The original school prayer ruling stated that “a union of 
government and religion tends to [among other things] degrade 
religion.”19 And as I have argued elsewhere, practices like school 
prayer lost the support of many elites in the 1960s precisely because 
of a sense that such practices had made mainstream American 
Christianity self-satisfied—had led it to ignore pervasive injustices 
such as racial segregation—because of “the illusion that America was 
a ‘Christian nation.’”20 
Some prominent mainline Protestants, for example, argued that 
public religious ceremonies were “often in content little more than 
the national culture religion,”21 encouraging a “national self-
righteousness” and an “emphasis on social conformity.”22 They 
 17. Id. at 1400 (referring to “the state’s verbal and symbolic endorsement” as a case in 
which “practice lagged behind principle”). 
 18. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (majority-ratified 
official prayers at high school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (state-
sponsored prayer by clergyman at school graduation); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573 (1989) (crèche erected in government building); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980), reh’g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981) (posting of Ten Commandments in schools); 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school-sponsored Bible readings); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-composed official school prayers). 
 19. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. 
 20. Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 1009, 1014–16 (2002) (citing various sources). 
 21. Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments (Aug. 8, 1966) 
(statement of Robert S. Alley), reprinted in ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, 
THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 247, 250 (1994). 
 22. JOHN C. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 7 (1958). 
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charged that official prayers were “more akin to a national cult than 
to the faith of the New Testament” and that pervasive racial injustice 
revealed “the shallowness of the public religious sentiments of the 
era.”23 They argued that eliminating official religious ceremonies 
would “dissipat[e] the myth that ours is a Christian country” and 
would deliver the Christian church from a posture of privilege into a 
posture of seeking justice and freedom for all people.24 These 
sentiments reflect an application in the 1960s of the voluntarist 
warning that close government-religious interaction—even when 
meant to help religion—can threaten the independent, prophetic 
role of religious organizations and communities. 
But in all likelihood, the primary rationale for the school prayer 
decisions was a concern that such practices relegated religious 
dissenters to an unequal position. In the decisions of the 1960s, the 
Court extended this concern beyond minority or dissenting Christian 
denominations to protect non-Christians and those with no religious 
faith at all. The 1961 decision striking down requirements that 
officeholders declare belief in God, for example, emphasized that the 
state may not “aid all religions as against nonbelievers, [or] those 
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those 
religions founded on different beliefs.”25 This extension of Religion 
Clause limitations no doubt reflected the nation’s increasing 
pluralism in matters of religion. As that pluralism has increased, any 
official religious exercise by government—no matter how general its 
terms—has come more and more to seem partial, to exclude a 
significant number of views on religious questions. 
To put it another way, the increase in religious pluralism is one 
of the developments since the early republic that has affected how 
the voluntary principle should apply today. As I have tried briefly to 
show, the voluntary principle as adopted in the early republic 
contained ambiguities and internal tensions on the question of 
government-sponsored religious ceremonies. Such practices were 
 23. ALLEY, supra note 21, at 250. 
 24. Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a 1962 statement by Rev. 
Gerald Burrill, Episcopal Bishop of Chicago); see also COLIN W. WILLIAMS, WHAT IN THE 
WORLD? 64 (1964). 
 25. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 430 (1962) (“[T]he fact that the [state-composed official school] prayer may be 
denominationally neutral [cannot] . . . serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause . . . .”). 
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widely accepted, but they conflicted in principle with many of the 
underlying goals of the voluntary approach. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that modern decisions have pushed the voluntarist 
approach toward greater disapproval of government-sponsored 
religious ceremonies. Because of later developments, internal 
tensions in the church-state settlement on this topic have been 
resolved in favor of striking down more and more of these 
practices.26 
B. Government Aid to Religious Organizations 
A second key church-state question, in the early 1800s and 
today, is whether government may provide tax-supported assistance 
for valuable services—such as education and social services—that are 
rendered by religious organizations. 
On this score, again, the antebellum church-state settlement 
contained some internal tensions. At its core, the voluntary principle 
(as described by Baird) includes some strong statements against 
government support for religious activity by private organizations. As 
I noted earlier, the voluntary principle meant that no level of 
government “does any thing directly for the maintenance of public 
worship[;] . . . no where does the civil power defray the expenses of 
the churches, or pay the salaries of ministers of the gospel, excepting 
in the case of a few chaplains connected with the public service.”27 As 
a result, Baird said, religion in America had to rely, “under God, 
upon the efforts of its friends, acting from their own free will.”28 The 
advantage of this was that Americans had “been trained to exercise 
the same energy, self-reliance, and enterprise in the cause of religion 
 26. The argument here is not that later developments can justify striking down a 
practice that was clearly consistent with the original meaning of the Religion Clauses or the 
founding-era settlement. The argument is that where the original settlement contained 
ambiguities, later developments can help determine how to resolve the ambiguities in applying 
the settlement today. 
The current case law, of course, also reflects ambivalence and tension about the 
permissibility of government-sponsored religion. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (avoiding question of whether “under God” in school 
recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984) (permitting a crèche in a city-sponsored Christmas display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983) (permitting official legislative prayers and chaplaincies). 
 27. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 288. 
 28. Id. (describing this as “the grand and only alternative” in America). 
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which they exhibit in other affairs.”29 For example, if a church 
building were damaged or destroyed, “instead of looking to some 
government official for the means of needful repair, a few of [the 
congregation] put their hands into their pockets, and suppl[ied] 
these themselves, without delay or the risk of vexatious refusals from 
public functionaries.”30 These passages quickly but forcefully make 
the case—still highly relevant today—that government support for a 
religious entity’s activities can rob the entity of its independence and 
vitality. Government assistance may be “delay[ed],” may come with 
“vexatious” strings attached, and may undermine a religious 
community’s “energy, self-reliance, and enterprise.”31 
Remember, however, that Baird simultaneously emphasized the 
many “indirect” ways in which government could support 
Christianity or religion in general—ways that extended to tax-
financed support for religious education and social services.32 For 
example, governments in the antebellum period commonly assisted 
religiously inspired education, “though in doing so, they often 
assist[ed] the cause of religion, in what might be considered almost 
the most direct manner possible.”33 States gave aid to “colleges 
directed by religious men, . . . while well aware that the colleges 
aided by such grants [were] under a decided religious influence;” 
states gave aid “without stipulating for the slightest control over 
these institutions.”34 The states also aided many preparatory 
academies—schools for teenage males preparing for college—of 
which many were “conducted by ministers of the gospel and other 
religious men” and therefore were “nurseries of vast importance 
both for the church and the state.”35 As to state-supported primary 
schools, Baird first made the relatively modest claim that their simple 
dissemination of knowledge, “although not religion, greatly 
facilitates [religion’s] diffusion by means of books.”36 But he 
added—and other sources confirm—that the Bible was “read in most 
of the schools,” and that “[w]here [primary-school teachers were] 
 29. Id. at 292. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 33. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 277. 
 34. Id. at 278. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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pious, they [found] no difficulty in giving a great deal of religious 
instruction.”37 
State governments also provided liberal amounts of aid to social-
welfare entities such as “asylums for the deaf and dumb, and for the 
blind, almost all of which institutions [were] under a decidedly 
religious influence.”38 And states with large cities also gave support 
to religiously inspired “retreats or houses of refuge, where young 
offenders . . . who have not gone hopelessly astray, may be placed for 
reformation.”39 The precedent for today’s charitable-choice and 
“faith-based” initiatives is unmistakable. 
If we again take Baird’s description as accurate, the church-state 
settlement of the early republic seemingly drew a distinction between 
government: (a) supporting distinctively religious elements such as 
clergy, worship, and church buildings; and (b) supporting activities 
such as education and social services that were provided by religious 
organizations and contained religious elements. The latter activities 
offer a social benefit whether they are provided by religious or 
nonreligious organizations. Thus, one can argue that an entity 
providing the services should not be disqualified from state assistance 
simply because it is religiously affiliated or incorporates religious 
teachings into the activity. Such an idea has echoes in modern case 
law and legislation. The Court has held that states may include 
religious elementary and secondary schools in educational voucher 
programs40 but has also left the states free to deny generally available 
scholarships to students engaged in ministerial training, which the 
Court called a “distinct category of instruction” from other 
subjects.41 Likewise, recent charitable-choice programs offer aid to 
religious social-service providers on the same terms as their secular 
counterparts, but the aid may not go directly to distinctively 
religious activities such as “sectarian worship, instruction, or 
proselytization.”42 
 37. Id. at 279; see also ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 371–72 (rev. one-vol. ed. 1964) (noting “the common practice [in the 
1830s] of reading the King James Version of the Bible at the opening exercises in public 
schools”). 
 38. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 279. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 41. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004). 
 42. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
§ 104(j), 42 U.S.C. § 604A(j) (2002). 
7BER-FIN 12/1/2004 7:54 PM 
1593] The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy 
 1603 
 
But this line between “inherently religious” activities and 
education or social services reflects, again, an internal tension in the 
church-state settlement. Even aid to “inherently religious” activities 
typically provides some social benefit, as does aid to education or 
social services. Conversely, aid to activities such as education or social 
services provided by religious entities may likewise undercut some of 
the principles of voluntarism, as does aid to clergy or worship 
services. When religious schools or social services receive aid, they 
may become dependent on government rather than on the energy 
and philanthropy of their members, and so lose their vitality. They 
may also lose their independence because of conditions that 
government places on its aid. Such concerns continue to play a role 
in modern-day separationist arguments against government aid to 
religious schools and social services.43 
If the voluntary principle contains internal tensions concerning 
educational or social service aid, how do modern developments affect 
the application of the principle? Within a few years after Baird’s 1844 
book, many Protestants began to argue that the voluntary principle 
forbade state aid to the newly appearing Roman Catholic schools. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, this position had become 
dominant and was defended in part on the ground that it promoted 
voluntarism and the separation of church and state.44 But the 
opposition to parochial school aid was also tainted with simple 
dislike of, and often unwarranted prejudice against, the Catholic 
Church and Catholic citizens.45 Explicit theological attacks on 
 43. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(arguing that state inspections of religious schools receiving aid “raises more than an imagined 
specter of governmental ‘secularization of a creed’”); Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and 
the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separation of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 
1062 (2002) (warning that religious groups may “become nondescript members of a social 
service organization class vying for governmental aid”). 
 44. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 219–23 
(2002); Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. 
REV. 45 (2003). 
 45. For presentations of the evidence of anti-Catholicism, see, for example, Brief of the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6–15, Mitchell 
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648); HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 201–19, 
246–51; LLOYD JORGENSEN, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925 
(1987); Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: 
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551 (2003); John 
C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 279, 297–303 (2001); Douglas Laycock, The Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 
EMORY L.J. 43, 50–51 (1997); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First 
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Catholicism were common in the anti-aid movement. Moreover, the 
Protestant majority’s arguments for private philanthropy and church-
state separation were selective and self-serving. The aid opponents 
doggedly defended Protestant-style religious exercises in state-
operated schools through most of the nineteenth century.46 And as 
Baird’s description indicates, the no-aid rule seldom if ever extended 
to colleges, the sector of education in which Protestants maintained 
their own institutions.47 The Protestant majority’s rules against aid to 
“sectarian” institutions were thoroughly self-serving. 
The major development of recent decades has been the rise of 
the welfare state—the extension of government financial assistance 
(and regulation) into most areas of life, including education and 
social services. The welfare state sets new baselines. Generally, 
religious schools and social services now benefit from aid only as part 
of a broader program in which aid also flows to nonreligious 
counterparts: private entities, public schools, and social service 
agencies. 
By contrast, the voluntary principle (as Baird saw it) trained 
Americans “to exercise the same energy, self-reliance, and enterprise 
in the cause of religion which they exhibit in other affairs.”48 In the 
early republic, the elimination of tax support for clergy and churches 
put religion on the same voluntary footing as most other activities, 
which likewise were not government-supported. But in today’s 
different circumstances, it is at best uncertain whether the voluntary 
principle is served by withholding funding for those schools or social 
services that are religiously inspired or incorporate religious 
messages. This is so for two related reasons. 
First, equal support to religious choices, when secular choices are 
supported, may actually be necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of 
voluntarism: ensuring that religious activities thrive or fail on the 
basis of the free choice of individuals, or as the Supreme Court has 
put it, “according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its 
dogma.”49 The exclusion of religious schools or social services from 
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 665–75 (1998), 
reviewed by Richard W. Garnett, Brown’s Promise, Blaine’s Legacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 651, 
670–74 (2000). 
 46. Jeffries and Ryan, supra note 45, at 303. 
 47. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 48. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 292. 
 49. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
7BER-FIN 12/1/2004 7:54 PM 
1593] The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy 
 1605 
 
funding programs creates a disincentive for beneficiaries to use 
religious options as compared with subsidized secular options. In the 
welfare state, therefore, equal funding for religiously oriented 
activities often serves the goal of voluntary choice and indeed may be 
crucial to it. Religion must make its own way under the voluntary 
principle, but that does not mean forcing it to overcome special 
barriers and disabilities. Put differently, in the welfare state, 
excluding religious entities from assistance is just as much a state 
intervention into voluntary religious life as is including them—
perhaps a greater intervention. The modern Court seems to have 
accepted this argument to the point of holding that religious choices 
generally may be included in funding programs,50 though it has 
shown some reluctance to hold that they must be.51 
Second, and related, the welfare state particularly complicates the 
effects of aid on church autonomy. The conditions that accompany 
government assistance can certainly cause religious organizations to 
lose vitality, stray from their distinctive mission, and become 
dependent on government. But in the welfare state, the vitality and 
mission of religious organizations also face threats if these 
organizations are denied assistance while their secular competitors 
receive it. Religious organizations must struggle to overcome the 
relative disability of being denied significant government benefits. 
They may be pressured to become wholly secular in order to receive 
aid on a level playing field. Or they may be pressured to alter their 
programs and messages in order to attract more private support—not 
the level of support that their original messages would attract, but 
the extra support necessary to compete against government-favored 
secular institutions.52 
Thus, on the question of government assistance, the church-state 
settlement of the early republic again contained some internal 
tensions. And again, subsequent developments may have affected 
 50. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51. Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting states to single out 
ministerial students for exclusion from state education scholarships), with Rasenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (forbidding the exclusion of a student 
religious publication from a state university’s general program of subsidizing publications). 
 52. See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional 
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 195–96 (2003); see also Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and 
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 783, 798 (2002). 
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how those ambiguities have been resolved in modern decisions. In 
this instance, the development of the welfare state has strengthened 
the case for the equal inclusion of religious schools and social services 
in funding programs. 
C. Religious Autonomy vs. Generally Applicable Laws 
The third major church-state dispute today concerns the conflict 
between religiously motivated conduct and generally applicable laws 
that in a given case restrict such conduct. Courts have pondered the 
extent to which religious conduct should be exempt from such laws. 
The Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith,53 ruled that 
individuals are not entitled to such exemptions under the Free 
Exercise Clause in most cases.54 But other decisions suggest that 
religious organizations may enjoy some rights to exemption, either 
under the Free Exercise Clause or under principles of 
nonentanglement and church-state separation founded in the 
Establishment Clause.55 
Under either rubric, free exercise or nonentanglement, some 
right of exemption from the law is important to the autonomy of 
religious organizations, as I will detail below.56 And in turn, the 
autonomy of religious organizations is a corollary of the voluntary 
principle: autonomy allows religious communities to organize 
themselves and define their missions according to their own 
voluntary choices, without government interference. 
Although autonomy is important to religious organizations 
either through free exercise or nonentanglement principles, the 
Court’s decision in Smith has significantly limited free exercise claims 
and thus has posed a threat to the existence of a constitutional right 
of autonomy for religious communities. I am quite sympathetic to 
the efforts in this conference to preserve such a right in the face of 
Smith. These include Professor Kathleen Brady’s argument that the 
freedom of communities is essential to the formation of their 
 53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54. Some recent decisions, however, suggest a limited impact for Smith, recognizing 
religious exemptions for individuals when the law in question already recognizes exemptions 
for comparable secular interests. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 
F.3d 359, 364–67 (3d Cir. 1999); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1550–53 (D. Neb. 
1996). 
 55. Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501–04 (1979). 
 56. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
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members’ beliefs, which remain highly protected under Smith,57 and 
Professor Perry Dane’s argument that religious organizational 
autonomy claims are more bounded and defined than the open-
ended claims to free exercise exemptions rejected in Smith.58 But for 
purposes of this Comment on the founding-era voluntary principle 
and its implications for today, I want to treat church autonomy 
claims as simply a subset of the broader question of whether religious 
practices are ever constitutionally exempt from general laws that 
apply to them. 
Which position on constitutionally mandated religious 
exemptions—recognizing them, or rejecting them—is more faithful 
to the founding-era settlement and the voluntary principle? This 
question has sparked a lively historical debate. Defenders of 
mandatory exemptions, such as Justice O’Connor and Professor 
Michael McConnell, argue that the founding generation understood 
free exercise as a substantive right to engage in religious practices 
except where the practice disturbed “public peace” or the rights of 
others.59 They point to state constitutional provisions, which almost 
unanimously defined the limits of religious freedom in such terms, 
and they reason that such definitions would be superfluous if 
religious freedom was understood to be limited by any and every law 
that was generally applicable and did not single out religion.60 On 
the other side, opponents of mandatory exemptions, including 
Justice Scalia and Professor Philip Hamburger, argue that the 
references to “public peace” encompassed any generally applicable 
law.61 Hamburger quotes a number of leading proponents of free 
exercise during the founding era who emphasized only that the 
government should not purposely involve itself in religious matters 
 57. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons 
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633.  
 58. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715. 
 59. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549–64 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of 
Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 819 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Critique]; Michael W. McConnell, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]. 
 60. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 552–55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); McConnell, Origins, supra 
note 59, at 1462–63; McConnell, Critique, supra note 59, at 831–32. 
 61. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring); Philip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemptions: An Historical Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
915, 915–19 (1992). 
7BER-FIN 12/1/2004 7:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1608 
 
and who conceded the duty to obey the general civil laws.62 
Professor Marci Hamilton presents similar evidence in this 
conference and elsewhere.63 
Although I think that the proexemptions approach reads the 
founding era more accurately, the historical materials certainly 
provide grist for both interpretations. Let us assume, then, that 
exemptions present another issue on which the founding-era 
settlement and its principle of voluntarism were ambiguous or 
contained internal tensions. Accordingly, in choosing between these 
interpretations, we again might wish to consider the effect of 
intervening developments. Which view, then, better implements the 
voluntary principle in the light of those developments? 
One primary development today is the increase of religious 
pluralism. The increase in religious pluralism may mean that religious 
exemptions are more necessary to preserve the substance of the 
voluntary principle. The vast range of newer religions and religious 
practices in America will generate many more unanticipated and 
unintended impositions on religion from general laws. To prevent 
such impositions, courts will have to declare religious exemptions in 
particular cases as the need becomes apparent. On the other hand, 
religious pluralism also includes a rise in the number of Americans 
who explicitly proclaim no religious faith and derive their deep moral 
convictions from unabashedly secular sources. This development 
makes it more difficult to justify, in a normative sense, a special 
concern for the autonomy of religious conscience and religious 
communities as against secular counterparts. One possible answer is 
to define “religious” conscience very broadly, as the Court did in the 
Vietnam-era draft cases.64 Another answer is simply to press forward 
and continue to treat religious conscience differently from secular 
conscience, as I believe there are good reasons to do under our 
Constitution.65 
 62. HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 937–46. 
 63. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1157 [hereinafter Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine]; Marci A. 
Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole, 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002). 
 64. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339–44 (1970); United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
 65. To put the argument briefly: If the First Amendment gives distinctive protection to 
religious practice by private groups, it also places distinctive limits on government espousing or 
promoting religious ideas. The common principle is minimizing government involvement in 
religious life and religious matters. In striking down government-sponsored prayers and 
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Whatever the implications of religious pluralism, the other major 
relevant development in modern America—the rise of the welfare 
state—points more clearly in favor of religious exemptions, 
institutional as well as individual. The rise of modern government 
vastly increases the number and scope of laws that can conflict with 
the voluntary choices of individuals and communities concerning 
religious exercise. Such conflicts will be relatively infrequent when 
government is small in scope and limits itself to preventing direct 
interference with the bodily or property interests of others. But the 
conflicts will multiply when government, as in the welfare state, 
prohibits certain actions to prevent diffuse harms throughout society, 
or harms that may occur indirectly or in the future rather than 
immediately. 
As I have already mentioned, opponents of exemptions, such as 
Professors Hamburger and Hamilton, point out that many of the 
leading clergy proponents of free exercise in the founding era 
explicitly supported the rule of law and counseled obedience to the 
laws.66 But this argument disregards the possibility that these writers 
endorsed laws limited to a certain scope—far more limited than the 
overall scope of laws today—and that they did not give carte blanche 
to whatever secular law was on the books. For example, when 
William Penn defended free exercise rights, he denied that religious 
believers sought exemption from laws “that tend to Sober, Just, and 
Industrious Living.”67 Other eighteenth-century commentators on 
religious liberty likewise spoke of laws that served serious social 
interests, arguing for example that magistrates were “obliged to 
maintain society and punish all those who destroy the foundations, 
as murderers and robbers do.”68 And religious-freedom pioneer 
rejecting the argument that this step would treat religious ideas differently from nonreligious 
ones, the Court said that “[t]he First Amendment protects . . . religion by quite different 
mechanisms” from other ideas; “[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation and 
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the 
private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 589, 591 (1992). For fuller presentations of such arguments, see, for example, 
Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They Are Wrong, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 440–41 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling 
Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 66. HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 937–46; Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note 
63, at 1156. 
 67. William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE 
WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 457 (photo. reprint 1974) (1726). 
 68. Pierre Bayle, Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Christ: Compel Them To 
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Roger Williams, in the words of a leading modern scholar, 
emphasized that “civil government was limited to its responsibility 
for preserving peace and civility”; therefore, Williams did not accept 
“subjecting the claims of conscience to any generally applicable law 
so long as it does not deliberately infringe upon religious belief or 
act. Rather, . . . Williams saw conscience subjected to particular laws, 
and he viewed these laws as within the specific scope of the 
government’s ordained responsibilities.”69 
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson, who made statements suggesting 
that religious-freedom rights would never overcome general civic 
duties,70 also proceeded from the premise that civic duties were 
limited to avoiding identifiable injury to others.71 Professor 
Hamburger likewise observes that founding-era proponents of free 
exercise did not emphasize a general right of exemption in significant 
part because, at that time, “the jurisdiction of civil government and 
the authority of religion were frequently considered 
distinguishable”72—a premise that would no longer hold true once 
government’s jurisdiction greatly expanded in the twentieth century. 
Consider just one example of expanded government that has 
major implications for the autonomy of religious communities. We 
now have numerous laws regulating private entities’ relations with 
their employees. Many such laws likely qualify as neutral and 
generally applicable under Employment Division v. Smith. But the 
founding generation would not have contemplated most of these 
laws, nor considered regulation of internal employment practices to 
be necessary to preserve “public peace.” Can one really argue that 
the concept of public peace, as the founding generation understood 
Come In, in PIERRE BAYLE’S PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY: A MODERN TRANSLATION AND 
CRITICAL INTERPRETATION 7, 167 (Amie Goodman Tannenbaum trans., 1987). 
 69. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 455, 486 (1991). These and analogous quotes are collected in McConnell, Critique, 
supra note 59, at 825–26. 
 70. Jefferson stated that a citizen has “no natural right in opposition to his social 
duties.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. 
Nelson: A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE REPUBLIC 
OF REASON: THE PERSONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 135 (Norman 
Cousins ed., 1988) [hereinafter REPUBLIC OF REASON]. 
 71. “The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to 
others.” Thomas Jefferson, Republican Notes on Religion and an Act Establishing Religious 
Freedom, Passed in the Assembly of Virginia, in the Year 1786, reprinted in REPUBLIC OF 
REASON, supra note 70, at 123. 
 72. Hamburger, supra note 61, at 936–37. 
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it, would encompass requiring employers to pay for controversial 
medical procedures for their employees?73 Likewise, the founding 
generation would not have contemplated the employment-
discrimination laws, let alone that those laws would apply facially to 
the hiring and firing of ministers. 
I certainly am not questioning the justice or wisdom of these 
statutes in their general application. But just as certainly, such 
statutes expand government’s scope beyond what the founding-era 
leaders envisioned when they said that religious freedom must give 
way to laws preserving public peace. The welfare-state expansion of 
government’s sphere will dramatically shrink the scope of religious 
autonomy from that of the founding era, unless there is some sort of 
doctrine exempting religious activity from some laws. Some principle 
of exemptions, whether under the Free Exercise or the 
Establishment clause, is necessary to preserve the terms of the 
church-state settlement under today’s circumstances. 
For these reasons, it is beside the point to argue against a 
doctrine of autonomy, as Professor Hamilton does in this 
conference, on the ground that it will immunize churches from 
liability for direct batteries against unconsenting third parties—that 
is, for sexual abuse of children.74 These and other direct batteries 
have always been the paradigm case of conduct falling outside the 
free exercise of religion.75 Those who espouse the antiexemptions 
position must deal with the tougher cases—the plethora of modern 
laws that rely on the possibility of diffuse or distant harms to restrict 
behavior today. 
If institutional autonomy is to be preserved, we also must deal 
with some misunderstandings and misplaced priorities concerning 
the concepts of autonomy and nonentanglement. First, we need to 
recognize that facially neutral, generally applicable laws sometimes 
can promote religious autonomy but at other times intrude on it. In 
Jones v. Wolf,76 the Court approved the application of “neutral 
principles of law” for disputes over church property. Jones’ approval 
 73. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) 
(rejecting an exemption from a law requiring coverage of contraceptives). 
 74. See Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note 63, at 1210. 
 75. For documentation of a standard focusing on direct invasions of others’ interests, 
see, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1145 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism]. 
 76. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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of “neutral principles” might be seen as precedent for the Smith 
ruling that a neutral, generally applicable law satisfies the Free 
Exercise Clause no matter how serious a restriction it imposes on 
religious practice. But as Professor Dane points out in his 
contribution, Jones reflected quite a different premise.77 The Court 
there reasoned that the general laws of property and trusts are 
designed to “order[ ] private rights and obligations to reflect the 
intentions of the parties”; therefore, by including appropriate legal 
provisions, “a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over 
the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the 
desires of the members,” and “civil courts will be bound to give 
effect to the result indicated by the parties.”78 Jones recognized that 
many neutral laws can facilitate a religious community’s self-
definition precisely because their neutrality allows them to serve as 
vessels for a wide variety of organizational choices. But that 
argument only extends to laws that facilitate organizations’ choices. 
It provides no support for laws like the peyote prohibition in Smith 
or the employment discrimination laws as applied to church 
employees, which override choices and thus intrude on the 
autonomy of religious life.79 Such laws should not get a 
constitutional pass just because they are facially neutral; they ought 
to be justified as enforcing legitimate boundaries on the scope of 
religious freedom. 
A second complication arises from a misplaced priority between 
two aspects of church autonomy—or, put differently, two aspects of 
government nonentanglement in religion. One aspect concerns 
whether religious organizations are actually free to organize 
themselves, define their mission, and choose their workers without 
undue government interference—this might be called “substantive 
nonentanglement.” Another aspect concerns whether judges or 
other government officials rest their decision making on theological 
judgments that are (it is asserted) beyond their authority or 
competence—principles forbidding such judgments might be called 
 77. Dane, supra note 58, at 1736. 
 78. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04, 606. 
 79. For fuller articulations of this distinction, see Thomas C. Berg, The Federal 
Constitution, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, A STUDY OF IDENTITY, 
LIBERTY AND THE LAW (James A. Serritella et al. eds., forthcoming 2005); Dane, supra note 
58; Ira Mark Ellmann, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church 
Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1406–07, 1422–23 (1981). 
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“decisional nonentanglement.” Both of these principles of 
nonentanglement help secure religious autonomy from state 
interference. But today, decisional nonentanglement seems to be the 
dominant focus, rather than just one component, of religious 
autonomy. Jones, for example, allows courts to apply neutral 
principles of law to a church property dispute, except when doing so 
would require the court to “conside[r] doctrinal matters, whether 
the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of the faith.”80 And 
one of the most common rationales for exempting churches’ 
decisions concerning ministers from the antidiscrimination laws is 
that such lawsuits would require courts to decide religious questions 
concerning the minister’s competence or suitability.81 
I suggest that decisional nonentanglement, though often 
important, is less central to religious autonomy than is substantive 
nonentanglement. More important than whether courts avoid 
theological questions is whether religious organizations are 
substantively free to organize themselves and define their mission 
free from unwarranted governmental interference. The ministerial 
exemption should rest fundamentally on the right of a church to 
choose its leaders and those who speak for it; to say that it rests on 
saving the courts from confronting theological questions is to 
misplace priorities. We keep courts out of such questions not just for 
the sake of doing so, but ultimately for the sake of substantive 
religious autonomy: when judges make theological determinations, 
they may distort and unjustifiably override a church’s organization 
and self-understanding. 
In fact, the emphasis on decisional nonentanglement may 
actually detract from substantive religious autonomy. Smith, for 
example, rejected the constitutional-exemptions approach in 
significant part because it would require courts to consider how 
central a practice was to a faith—before balancing it against the 
state’s interests—and such an inquiry “is akin to the unacceptable 
 80. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Md. & Va. 
Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 81. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1332–33 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also EEOC v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.*, 804–05 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. 
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. 
Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 347–50 (5th Cir. 
1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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‘business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious 
claims.’”82 The idea of decisional nonentanglement—the fear that 
saying anything remotely theological would intrude on religious 
autonomy—led the Court to cut back dramatically on the 
substantive autonomy of religious organizations under the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Of course, accepting in principle a doctrine of exemptions for 
church autonomy only begins the inquiry. There are serious 
questions as to how far any such exemptions should extend, and 
what social interests should limit them. Under any defensible 
approach, lines will need to be drawn. No serious commentator 
asserts that constitutional autonomy authorizes church leaders 
following church doctrines to inflict physical harm on others, even if 
the harm-producing conduct is central to the doctrines. Judges or 
legislators attempting to apply constitutional principles will have to 
distinguish clear or direct harms to others (such as sexual assaults on 
adults or children) from speculative and indirect harms (such as, 
perhaps, those following from peyote use). Or the proper distinction 
may be between matters truly “internal” to the church (perhaps the 
employment of clergy) and those better characterized as “external” 
(for example, the treatment of children attending a church-operated 
school). Even harms to others, of course, are not automatically 
attributable to the church entity, if the wrongdoer is acting outside 
the scope of his employment. And where the church entity is 
properly liable, autonomy may still impose limits on the size or scope 
of the remedy.83 
The fact that constitutional autonomy has limits does not mean 
it is nonexistent. In her contribution to this conference, Professor 
Hamilton concedes that some religious practices that violate general 
statutes on the books are nevertheless consistent with the public 
good and ought to be exempted by the legislature.84 But she asserts 
that courts are unable to draw such lines in constitutional litigation.85 
 82. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 83. For varying views on these issues in the context of sexual abuse cases, see, for 
example, Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789; John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of Churches 
for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167 (2002). I take 
no position here on the scope of church autonomy in such cases. 
 84. Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note 63, at 1174. 
 85. Id. at 1198. 
7BER-FIN 12/1/2004 7:54 PM 
1593] The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy 
 1615 
 
This concession switches the debate from substantive to institutional 
questions. It switches the debate from the meaning of religious 
freedom—does it point to exemptions in some legal form?—to the 
boundaries of justiciability and judicial competence. I think that 
coherent and judicially manageable lines do exist so that we are not 
forced to accept each and every generally applicable law no matter 
how severe its impact on religious autonomy.86 But the location of 
those lines is a matter for other articles and future conferences. 
 86. For efforts to develop principles distinguishing protected from unprotected religious 
conduct, see, for example, the articles in Symposium: Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (Spring 1999); Berg, supra note 65, at 429–32; Douglas Laycock, 
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the 
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402–13 (1981); McConnell, 
Revisionism, supra note 75, at 1145–49; Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause 
Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299. 
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